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Security model

This page describes what matter-bridge protects, what it relies on you for, and what it cannot do yet. To report a vulnerability, see SECURITY.md: privately, never in a public issue. A problem in rs-matter itself is reported to rs-matter’s own security process; we will help coordinate.

  • The fabric’s CA (root and intermediate keys) and the controller’s operational key, in the data directory. Whoever has them can add nodes to the fabric and control every device on it.
  • Control of devices. Whoever can publish to matter/# can control them, commission new ones, and open commissioning windows that hand a device to another controller.
  • Network credentials given to devices during Bluetooth commissioning.
Threat Defense
Eavesdropping or tampering on the network Matter’s own security: every operational message is encrypted and authenticated in a CASE session; commissioning starts with PASE, authenticated by the device’s passcode.
Malformed or hostile messages from a device or the network Messages are decoded by rs-matter, and values are converted through the data model’s types before they reach MQTT. The bridge’s own decoders (JSON to TLV, onboarding codes, Thread datasets) are fuzzed. No unsafe code in this repository.
Malformed requests over MQTT Values are encoded only through the data model’s types; a request that does not fit is answered with an error. File and device names are checked.
Keys leaking The CA and the controller’s key stay in the data directory, written atomically and readable by their owner only; they are never published or logged. Wi-Fi passphrases and Thread datasets are never stored or logged.
Losing the fabric The data directory is all of it: back it up.
  • The MQTT broker. Require authentication on it, use its access control so only the bridge and trusted clients can publish to matter/#, and keep it off untrusted networks.
  • The data directory. Back it up and protect the backups like a password.
  • Which devices you commission (see below).
  • Device attestation is not verified yet. A Matter commissioner should check that a device’s attestation certificate chains to a Product Attestation Authority the CSA lists, and the device’s certification declaration, so that a counterfeit or tampered device is refused. That is not implemented yet; allow_unverified_attestation must stay on, and the bridge logs a warning for every device it commissions. Only commission devices you trust. This is the first item of the upstream work.
  • Test vendor id. The bridge administers devices as vendor id 0xFFF1, the CSA’s test vendor id for uncertified controllers.
  • No TLS to the MQTT broker yet. Run the broker on the same host or a trusted network, or put a TLS tunnel in between.
  • Not certified by the CSA, and not yet through a third-party security audit.