Security model
Gateways sit in public places, often on a pole, sometimes with no uplink. The design assumes somebody will hold one, plug into it and read its label.
Reporting a vulnerability
Section titled “Reporting a vulnerability”Email security@pulzr.net. Do not open a public issue. See SECURITY.md for what to include, response times and scope.
What protects a gateway
Section titled “What protects a gateway”| Concern | How |
|---|---|
| Adoption | A claim secret that never leaves the gateway; the cloud holds only its SHA-256. Nobody types a credential into the gateway. Provisioning |
| Console sign-in | Local password only while unadopted. Once adopted: your cloud account, or offline recovery signed by the fleet’s recovery key. Authentication |
| Root | No password. SSH as root takes the fleet key or a five-minute certificate signed for this gateway’s EUI. Organization admins use the console, never a shell. Who gets root |
| Local ports | The ethernet port is the console port and never serves DHCP. The setup AP is off unless raised by the reset button, and only when no uplink works. Setup access |
| Firmware | Ed25519-signed images, checked on the gateway before writing. Firmware |
| Add-ons | A signed apk repository per release, pinned to the exact base package. Add-ons |
| Management | A WireGuard tunnel that cannot leave on a metered link, or the SIM provider’s private network. Backhaul |
| Image build | uci-defaults scripts are guarded so none runs against the build host; CI checks it. |
What is not covered
Section titled “What is not covered”Physical access to storage. A Pi’s root filesystem is a plain squashfs on its SD card, and a RAK’s is in flash its U-Boot hands to anyone on the serial header. Closing that is secure boot and encrypted storage, which a Pi 4 or 5 can be made to do and the MT7628 cannot.
No secret belongs in the repository. Everything in boards/common/ssh/ is a public key. An image is built with the public halves of:
| Variable | Key |
|---|---|
PULZR_RECOVERY_PUBKEY |
Ed25519 key that signs offline recovery |
PULZR_FIRMWARE_PUBKEY |
Ed25519 key that signs firmware |
PULZR_SSH_CA_PUBKEY |
SSH user CA whose certificates root accepts |
The CA and fleet key in this tree are Pulzar’s. Replace them before building for your own fleet: Building from source.